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Chronic kidney failure is a global health issue that can often require a kidney donation.  
The supply of available kidneys, however, is limited, leading to a massive international kidney 
shortage that is growing rapidly each year.1 In responding to these shortages, perhaps, several 
countries have implemented policies that incentivize living kidney donation. Estimating the 
impact of these incentive policies on living kidney donations is important if we are to understand 
this global health crisis. Although previous studies have discovered a correlation between the 
incentivizing policies and living kidney donations, there has been little attempt made to control 
for confounding variables. This study estimates the effect of various governmentally 
implemented incentive policies on the number of living kidney donors by performing an 
econometric analysis using panel data obtained from select international sources. Panel data 
methods were used to estimate 14 econometric models to determine the significance of the 
polices in question. Overall, three out of the seven policies (or policy bundles) were found to 
have a significant positive effect on living kidney donation rates. Before discussing these 
empirical processes, this study first catalogs the incentivizing polices that countries have 
implemented; it explains why increasing organ donation numbers is critically important; and, it 














Kidney disease effects millions of people worldwide. An estimated 10% of the world’s 
population experiences this chronic medical condition.2 While worldwide demand for kidneys 
continues to grow at an estimated 8% each year, supply remains devastatingly low, resulting in a 
high number of deaths. This shortage has prompted some countries to re-assess their laws and 
policies in an effort to identify effective, but nonetheless ethical, incentives that will make organ 
donation more attractive to healthy citizens—as well as increase organ availability for the 
chronically ill. 
For this study, we will use the most recently available and up-to-date annualized data 
from Israel, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and 
Ireland3 to perform an econometric analysis to estimate the impact of mandated policy incentives 
on organ supply. Specifically, the analysis will estimate whether incentive policies increase 
donor rates after controlling for income and other variables.  
The thesis will include a review of the laws, policies and incentives implemented in 
Israel, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Ireland in 
an effort to ease supply shortages. It builds on the work of Vandana Apte and others who have 
demonstrated a correlation between a country implementing policies that provide living organ 
donors with various benefits and an increase in the number of living organ donors. Whether the 
 
2 “Chronic Kidney Disease.” World Kidney Day, 7 June 2019, www.worldkidneyday.org/faqs/chronic-kidney-
disease/.  
3 While these are not the only countries to have implemented such incentive policies, they are the seven countries 





rise in living donations is directly caused by the incentive policies that were implemented is 
disputed, but the correlation between the implementation of such policies and the rise in living 
donations, indicated below, is clear. Apte’s study was limited by the number of polices analyzed. 
By using appropriate econometric models on panel data, our study moves beyond correlation to 
establish causation. Additionally, we have added control variables and have used more up-to-
date data in our research.  
1.2 Background 
 
Kidneys filter wastes and excessive fluids from the blood which are then excreted in 
urine. CKD refers to the gradual loss of kidney function and is linked to Type 1 and Type 2 
diabetes, high blood pressure, smoking, obesity, Glomerulonephritis, intestinal nephritis, 
polycystic kidney disease and ageing.4 Kidney failure patients have two treatment options: 
• Transplantation – Utilizing live and deceased donor kidneys. Transplantation is the 
preferred long-term treatment with survival rates for transplant recipients over 80% in the 
first five years.  
• Dialysis – Is the only alternative treatment available and involves pumping a patient’s 
blood through an external circuit for filtration before pumping it back into the body. A 
typical hemodialysis schedule is three sessions per week, for three to five hours per 
session at a medical facility, or in some instances peritoneal dialysis at home.5 
 
4 “Chronic Kidney Disease.” Mayo Clinic, Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research, 15 Aug. 2019, 
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/chronic-kidney-disease/symptoms-causes/syc-20354521.  





Approximately 10-15% of the United States adult population suffers from chronic renal failure. 
The prevalence is reported as 11% in Australia, 10% in Singapore and 19% in Japan.6 Over two 
million people worldwide are estimated to receive treatment with dialysis or a kidney transplant, 
yet this number represents only 10% of people who require treatment to remain alive.7 Patients 
who receive a kidney transplant before, live an average of 10 to 15 years longer than if they 
stayed on dialysis. Younger adults benefit the most from a transplant, but even adults as old as 
75 gain an average of four more years after a transplant than if they had stayed on dialysis.8 
Currently, in the United States, over 100,000 people are awaiting a kidney transplant.9 
Most of them have suffered kidney failure. When this occurs, patients are placed on dialysis.  
People on dialysis for longer than five years make up one-fifth of the national organ waitlist.10 In 
the United States, dialysis is expensive, costing the Medicare system an average of $90,000 per 
patient annually, for a total of $28 billion across all patients compared to organ transplants that 
cost $3.4 billion annually.11 In the United States, a person is added to the kidney transplant 
waitlist every nine minutes.12 The long waitlist indicates that the demand for kidneys outstrips 
their supply. Given the high number of patients and low number of donors, seventeen people a 
day die while waiting for a kidney transplant.  
 
6 Yaghoubi Fard, Safiye, et al. “Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Dialysis and Kidney Transplant in Patients with Renal 
Impairment Using Disability Adjusted Life Years in Iran.” Medical Journal of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran University of 
Medical Sciences, 28 June 2016, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4972066/.  
7 The contribution of chronic kidney disease to the global burden of major noncommunicable diseases. Retrieved 
April 13, 2021, from https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21993585/ 
8 “Kidney Transplant.” BIDMC of Boston, www.bidmc.org/centers-and-departments/transplant-institute/kidney-
transplant.  
9 Organ Donation and Transplantation Statistics. (2016, January 11). Retrieved October 02, 2020, from 
https://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/factsheets/Organ-Donation-and-Transplantation-Stats 
10 Hart, A., Smith, J. M., Skeans, M. A., Gustafson, S. K., Wilk, A. R., Castro, S., Foutz, J., Wainright, J. L., Snyder, J. 
J. Kasiske, B. L. & Israni, A. K.  OPTN/SRTR 2018 Annual Data Report: Kidney. Am J Transplant 2019; 20 (Suppl 1):  20– 130. 
doi: 10.1111/ajt.15672 
11 United States Renal Data System. 2018 USRDS Annual Data Report: Epidemiology of kidney disease in the United States. 
National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, Bethesda, MD, 201 






This imbalance is not global, however, as other countries have incentivized a myriad of 
fiscal, insurance and other arrangements to bridge supply and demand particularly related to 
living organ donation—specifically kidneys and livers—shortening waitlist times and decreasing 
the number of deaths. Organ transplants save thousands of lives each year. Currently, many of 
the live donors are at risk due to an unregulated organ trade that exploits the most vulnerable in 
developing countries and complicates legitimate organ donation efforts.  
1.2.1 Worldwide Kidney Shortage 
 
According to the World Health Organization, kidney transplants are carried out in 91 
countries with approximately 55,000 being performed in 2005. Patient access to kidneys varies 
across the world due to cost, medical technical capacity and most commonly, the availability of 
organs.13 This kidney shortage is a global problem hampered by sociocultural, legal, and other 
factors. In some countries, the problem is exacerbated by the prohibition of the sale of transplant 
organs from living donors. The shortage of an indigenous supply of organs has contributed to the 
development of the international organ trade, where participants travel internationally to obtain 
organs through commercial transactions. The organ trade has been recognized as a significant 
health and ethical policy issue across the world. A World Health Assembly resolution adopted in 
2004 (WHA57.18) urges Member States to “take measures to protect the poorest and vulnerable 
groups from transplant tourism and the sale of tissues and organs.”14 
 
13 “The State of the International Organ Trade: a Provisional Picture Based on Integration of Available 
Information.” World Health Organization, World Health Organization, 4 Mar. 2011, 
www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/12/06-039370/en/.  
14 “The State of the International Organ Trade: a Provisional Picture Based on Integration of Available 






Over the past 30 years, many countries have passed legislation prohibiting monetary 
compensation for organ donation in favor of altruistic organ donation. The reliance on altruism, 
combined with medical advances in immunosuppressive therapies, has resulted in a growing 
waiting list for donor kidneys. Unfortunately, supplying organs altruistically only meets a 
fraction of the need. Thus, there is a growing trend in some countries to provide individuals who 
choose to donate their organs with economic and medical benefits in an effort to make organ 
donation more appealing and popular. These countries include Israel, Singapore, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Ireland. They are adopting the 
provision of financial incentives as an alternative to altruistic organ donation.15 
1.2.2 Organ Trafficking 
 
The presence of organ harvesting and trafficking remains prevalent, even after many 
countries have signed treaties and implemented laws in an attempt to restrict the international 
organ trade. With transplant waitlist times growing, and an increased number of people suffering 
from kidney failure, the WHO estimates that 10% of the global kidney transplants performed in 
2004 were in patients from developed countries who traveled to developing nations to procure 
organs—otherwise known as transplant tourism.16 In the case of transplant tourism, patients 
travel internationally to receive their organ transplant in another country. A possible explanation 
is that the organs these patients require are not readily available in their home country, or their 
home country is not adequately set up for organ transplant surgery (e.g., Tajikistan and 
 
15 Ghods, Ahad J., and Shekoufeh Savaj. “Iranian Model of Paid and Regulated Living-Unrelated Kidney 
Donation.” American Society of Nephrology, American Society of Nephrology, 1 Nov. 2006, 
cjasn.asnjournals.org/content/1/6/1136.  
16 Tazeen H. Jafar, Organ Trafficking: Global Solutions for a Global Problem, American Journal of Kidney 





Azerbaijan).17 In some cases, private health insurance companies subsidize dialysis patients to 
travel to foreign countries for them to undergo transplant surgery there. Transplant tourism is 
cheaper than bearing the lifelong costs of hemodialysis.18 
There are many risks for patients and donors associated with procuring organs through 
transplant tourism and other such unregulated pathways. Patients are at high risk of contracting 
HIV and other unwanted infections during the procedure. Organ donors who participate in 
unregulated markets “are often poorly informed about the procedure, deprived of appropriate 
screening and of quality postoperative and continuing medical care, and not compensated as 
agreed upon.”19 Countries like Pakistan, India, Turkey, and the Philippines, operate “kidney 
bazars” that offer transplant packages ranging from $15,000-$150,000.20 Transplant tourism is 
popular in those countries where the majority of the population has low-income levels. In these 
countries, selling organs is a way for impoverished individuals to provide for their families, pay 
off debts, fulfill bride prices, and just make ends meet. 
While people who are impoverished have a “choice” about whether to donate their 
organs, the experience of the Falun Gong is a more extreme case. An ascetic religious group 
outlawed by the Chinese government, members of the Falun Gong have had their organs 
harvested unwillingly while imprisoned.21 China may appear to have one of the shortest organ 
waitlists, but its citizens do not donate organs for altruistic reasons, and the Chinese government 
 
17 Broumand, B, and R F Saidi. “New Definition of Transplant Tourism.” International journal of organ 
transplantation medicine vol. 8,1 (2017): 49-51. 
18 Katrina A. Bramstedt & Jun Xu, Checklist: Passport, Plane Ticket, Organ Transplant, 7 AM. J. TRANSPLANT 
1698 (2007).  
19 Caplan AL, Dominguez-Gil B, Matesanz R, Prior C.  Trafficking in organs, tissues and cells and trafficking in 
human beings for the purpose of the removal of organs. Joint Council of Europe/United Nations Study; 2009. 
20 Tazeen H. Jafar, Organ Trafficking: Global Solutions for a Global Problem, American Journal of Kidney 
Diseases, Volume 54, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 1145-1157, ISSN 0272-6386, https://doi.org/10.1053/j.ajkd.2009.08.014. 





does not have maximizing incentive policies in place; rather, religious prisoners have had their 
organs taken from them unwillingly. 
 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
1.3.1 Living-Donor Kidney Transplantation: Reducing Financial Barriers to 
Live Kidney Donation – Recommendations from a Consensus Conference22 
 
The American Society of Transplantation held a consensus conference in June 2014 to 
identify best practices for live kidney donation. They found that the financial cost associated 
with live kidney donation was a source of stress leading to lower donation rates, especially in 
those cases when live donors were incurred substantial financial penalties as a result of the donor 
process. They analyzed the costs for the organ donor, including out-of-pocket expenses (travel, 
lodging, meals parking, dependent care and uncovered medical expenses) with an estimated cost 
up to $20,000. For their analysis, they relied upon the 2014 Canadian research by Klarenbach et 
al which found that 96% of live kidney donors experienced negative financial consequences 
from having participated in a kidney donation. They also reported 47% lost wages. 
The conference participants concluded that live kidney donation should be a financially 
neutral process; donors should not suffer financial losses as a result of their decision to 
participate in a kidney transplant. They recommended the following initiatives: 
 
22 Tushla, Lara, et al. “Living-Donor Kidney Transplantation: Reducing Financial Barriers to Live Kidney Donation-
Recommendations from a Consensus Conference.” American Society of Nephrology, American Society of 





• Allocate resources for standardized reimbursement of donor lost wages and incidental 
costs. 
• Pass legislation to offer employment and insurability protections. 
• Promote further research to identify systemic barriers to living donation to ensure the 
creation of mitigation strategies. 
1.3.2 Report on Living Organ Donor Benefit Policies in Eight Countries other 
than Iran or the United States 
 
Apte (2019) reported that the United States has seen a downward trend over the past five 
years in the number of organ transplants.23 To address this organ shortage, she argues that the 
United States could consider a program that offers living organ donors a reimbursement package 
of fiscal and other incentives. In the article, Apte describes the reimbursement packages offered 
to living donors in seven countries: Saudi Arabia, Israel, Australia, Singapore, Canada, Ireland, 
and New Zealand. Having reviewed the reimbursement packages and the reported increase in the 
number of living donors, Apte concludes that there is at least a correlation between the 
reimbursement packages and the increase in living donor transplants (at the time of publication it 
was too early to determine if this applied to Ireland (2014) or New Zealand (2015)).  
In Saudi Arabia and Israel, donor numbers increased by over 100% while Singapore, 
Australia, and Canada showed more modest increases. In Australia, the reimbursement package 
is not as generous as in the other countries of Apte’s study. Between 2006 and 2010, select 
provinces of Canada implemented reimbursement packages for living organ donors. The effect 
of these policies on the total number of living organ donors in Canada has been negligible, with 
 
23 Apte, V. (July 2019). Report on Living Organ Donor Benefit Policies in Eight Countries other than lran or the 






the number of living organ donors having remained static from 2003 to 2012. Apte does not 
comment on the situation in Singapore (50% is a significant increase) or Australia, but speculates 
that the situation in Canada “illustrates the need for a comprehensive national policy for 
reimbursing living organ donors.” 24  
Apte concludes that the reimbursement packages in the countries she studied may have 
indeed served as a financial incentive for citizens to donate their organs. While there is an 
upward trend of living donors in these countries, the overall number of donors relative to the 
national population remains small: 571 in Saudi Arabia (population: 34.27 million), 134 in Israel 
(population: 9.05 million). The reasons for such low numbers of living organ donors could be 
that: a) The policies were not widely publicized; and b) The reimbursement packages do not 
provide living donors with enough of a financial incentive.  
A limitation of Apte’s study is that she does not include a more general baseline analysis 
of the economies of these countries which would have been helpful in determining the impact of 
such variables as GDP, income, and Gini coefficient. Greater understanding of baseline would 
assist in targeting any future incentives, taking into account different baselines between 
countries. For example, for countries that wish to incentivize living organ donation, which 
variable will give them the greatest return on their investment under each different economic and 
cultural condition? Are donors more willing to donate if travel is reimbursed verses the provision 
or reimbursement of childcare? Does this hold true across different countries? Do we know if the 
poor, developing countries are even in a position to offer reimbursement packages to living 
organ donors? If they are in such a position, is the resulting increase in living organ donors 
 
24 Apte, V. (July 2019). Report on Living Organ Donor Benefit Policies in Eight Countries other than lran or the 





greater or less than the increase in the wealthier, developed countries, after controlling for these 
baseline variables? 
Based on Apte’s research, my hypothesis is that a country like the United States—where 
there is great economic disparity—would see a dramatic increase in living organ donors if a 
generous reimbursement package were offered. If the United States considered offering long-
term health insurance, then my projection is that the number of living organ donors would rise 
dramatically as the promise of healthcare would motivate individuals without adequate 
healthcare to consider donating their organs. 
1.3.3 State Incentives to Promote Organ Donation: Honoring the Principles of 
Reciprocity and Solidarity Inherent in the Gift Relationship 
 
Levy (2018) describes the importance of state incentives to counterbalance the “chronic 
organ shortage.”25 She focuses on public policy incentives that countries either have, or could, 
implement. Having proposed a hypothetical case, Levy argues that the ethical considerations 
surrounding financial incentives would likely undercut any small gains to the number of living 
organ donors achieved through such an incentive program. Bridging the gap between the 
analytical framework of state incentives in organ donation and the reality of normative 
constraints, Levy concludes that altruism, as opposed to financial gain, should be the main 
reason people donate their organs.  
Levy’s research is important for my thesis because it addresses the ethics of incentivizing 
organ donation. While national and state financial incentives may seem like an appropriate 
solution to the problems created by transplant tourism and the risks involved with long wait 
 
25 Levy, M. (2018). State incentives to promote organ donation: Honoring the principles of reciprocity and solidarity 






times, governmental policies such as allocation priority, tax breaks, and health insurance 
coverage, are likely to play a role in the exploitation of financially insecure citizens, making 
them willing to treat their body as material resources to be exchanged for financial gain. Not 
only do the living organ donors risk their overall health, but they are coopted by an ethically 
dubious policy that exploits the poor in the interests of the rich.  
A limitation of Levy’s study is that she only focuses on one county, namely Israel. In 
much of the article, she engages in the hypothetical consideration of implementing incentivizing 
packages. Her argument would be more compelling and persuasive had she decided to illustrate 
her hypothetical generalizations about the ethics of incentive policies with real-life examples. 
While the altruistic argument is important, the lack of quantitative analysis limits the reader’s 
capacity to extrapolate to other contexts. 
1.3.4 Reducing the Shortage of Transplant Kidneys: A Lost Opportunity for 
the US Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) 
 
In the article, “Reducing the Shortage of Transplant Kidneys: A Lost Opportunity for the 
US Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)”, Frank McCormick, Philip J. Held, 
Glenn M. Chertow, Thomas G. Peters, and John P. Roberts consider the impact of President 
Trump’s “Executive Order on Advancing American Kidney Health” proposed in July 2019 and 
the subsequent rule amendment to the regulations to enact the National Organ Transplant Act of 
1984. McCormick laments that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the 
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) recent attempts through attempts at 
implanting the changes. While the recommendations for breaking down financial barriers that 
discourage donations, and the other disincentives to living donors, were all taken into account, it 





kidney donations in the neighborhood of 2,000 per year, instead of the requisite 15,000 per year 
(McCormack,1). McCormick discusses some the more robust strategies that these organizations 
could implement. 
The HRSA followed the minimum requirements listed in the executive order including 
reimbursement of lost wages, as well as childcare and elder care for living donors. They also 
raised the income ceiling on donors eligible for reimbursement. Following the federal poverty 
guidelines, they increased the threshold from 300% to 350% (McCormack, 1). The argument is 
that this will only increase organ donations around 9% in part because it only removes the 
financial barrier for low-income donors. McCormack notes that if the government would put 
more money toward removing financial barriers, they would spend less on dialysis treatment, 
saving more money overall. As mentioned earlier, the cost of dialysis for an individual suffering 
from organ failure is four times higher than the cost of a kidney transplant.   
McCormack also documents other barriers to living organ donation including, the risk of 
dying during transplant surgery, the pain and discomfort of the surgery, a decrease in the long-
term quality of life due to kidney removal, and the concern that a relative or friend might need 
the donor’s kidney in the future (McCormack 2.). It is in light of these barriers that McCormack 
recommends insurance policy reform: it should provide greater coverage for death, disability, 
and long-term health problems arising from an organ donation. He supports donor tax credits of 
$6,500 and concludes that the HRSA should promise to provide a kidney for a specific person of 
the donor’s choosing in the future. What we learn from McCormack’s study is that the United 
States’ organ donation incentives fall short compared to those of other countries. The effects of 





number of kidney donations in the United States and save the government millions by scaling 
back its over-reliance on dialysis treatment.  
A limitation of McCormack’s study is that the data used as the basis for the analysis is 
relatively old. This limits the utility of the analysis for a critique of the 2019 executive order. For 
my regression analysis, I use data as recent as 2019. As many of the organ donation policies are 
quite modern, it will be interesting to compare the results of McCormack’s analysis to mine. In 
particular, it will show if the trends are stronger as the policies have been in place longer.  
1.3.5 The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant 
Tourism 
 
In the article, “The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant 
Tourism”, Indian J. Nephrol notes that, due to the almost static organ supply, the World Health 
Organization called for action to be taken against the exploitation of vulnerable people in organ 
trafficking. Thus, a Summit Meeting was held in 2008 in Istanbul consisting of over 150 global 
representatives including politicians, scientists, and philosophers. The principles decided upon 
during the summit represent an international commitment to improving organ donation and 
transplant policies. Nephrol writes, “Access to healthcare is a human right but often not a 
reality.”26 Due the rising shortage of organs, and extreme poverty in many countries, individuals 
have become increasingly desperate to survive and will do anything necessary to make ends 
meet. Such desperation proves a fertile ground for the unethical practices of organ trafficking 
that the declaration deals with. 
 
26 “The declaration of Istanbul on organ trafficking and transplant tourism.” Indian journal of nephrology vol. 18,3 





Nephrol credits the participants of the summit with formally defining and determining the 
parameters of organ trafficking, transplant commercialism, and transplant tourism. The summit’s 
resulting declaration offers six key recommendations:  
1. National governments, working in collaboration with international and non-governmental 
organizations, should develop and implement comprehensive programs for the screening, 
prevention and treatment of organ failure. 
2. Legislation should be developed and implemented by each country or jurisdiction to 
govern the recovery of organs from deceased and living donors.  
3. Organs for transplantation should be equitably allocated within countries or jurisdictions 
to suitable recipients without regard to gender, ethnicity, religion, or social or financial 
status. 
4. The primary objective of transplant policies and programs should be optimal short- and 
long-term medical care. 
5. Jurisdictions, countries and regions should strive to achieve self-sufficiency in organ 
donation by providing a sufficient number of organs for residents. 
6. Organ trafficking and transplant tourism violate the principles of equity, justice, and 
respect for human dignity and should be prohibited.27  
The following strategies were recommended as fair and just ways to increase the donor pool and 
limit dangerous donation practices: 
• Remove obstacles and disincentives to deceased organ donation. 
• Mechanisms for informed consent should incorporate provisions for evaluating the 
donor's understanding. 
 
27 “The declaration of Istanbul on organ trafficking and transplant tourism.” Indian journal of nephrology vol. 18,3 





• All donors should undergo psychosocial evaluation. 
• Health and/or life insurance coverage and employment opportunities of persons who 
donate organs should not be compromised. 
• Legitimate expenses that may be reimbursed, including but not limited to, the cost of any 
medical and psychological, long-distance telephone calls, travel, accommodation, and 
lost income in relation to donation.28 
1.3.6 Additional Literature for Consideration 
 
For additional context, the supply of voluntary organ donations is severely inadequate 
relative to demand. While demand for organ donations is steadily rising the supply stays static. 
This is not only the case with kidneys but all living organ donations. 
There has long been debate over the feasibility and ethics of establishing a free organ 
market to mitigate this severe shortage. For example, proponents argue that an individual 
should be able to sell the rights to their organs either upon death or in a live donation. The sale 
of organs is prohibited almost everywhere in the world and the majority of political sentiments 
is against legalization of an organ market29. A brief summary of the positions and argument in 
favor of an organ market can be found in Henry Hausmann’s article “The Economics and 
Ethics of Markets for Human Organs.” The primary argument proposed is that a highly 
regulated and ethical market of live donor organs would help address the severe shortage of 
donor organs and therefore save lives. This paper takes a firm positions in favor of creating a 
legal market for human organ donations. 
 
28 “The declaration of Istanbul on organ trafficking and transplant tourism.” Indian journal of nephrology vol. 18,3 
(2008): 135-40. doi:10.4103/0971-4065.43686 






In this section, I have reviewed the literature relevant to my study of organ donation 
policies and their impact on living donor rates. In the next section I define financial incentives, 
non-financial incentives, and disincentives, followed by a summary of the incentive policy 
packages offers by Australia, Ireland, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. 
1.4 Incentive Policies 
 
To offset the dearth of donor kidneys, countries are implementing policies intending to 
resolve or dismantle the barriers deterring individuals from living kidney donation. These 
policies are seen as an adjunct to altruism and designed to increase the availability of donor 
organs. The policy variables in the model are summarized in Table 3.  
1.4.1 Incentive and Disincentive Definitions  
 
Financial Incentive — A financial incentive is the provision of something of material value to 
motivate consent for organ removal and may include direct payment for organs. It is more 
prevalent on the black market or indirectly through tax deductions, reimbursement of lost wages, 
medical cost, and childcare.   
Non-Financial Altruistic Incentives — These donors are motivated by selfless concern for the 
well-being of other citizens. Altruistic kidney donation is also known as “good Samaritan 
donation” which is the act of donating an organ for no specific recipient.  
Disincentive — Disincentives are the direct and indirect factors that living donors, researchers, 
and policy makers identify as disincentives to donating. Such disincentives include: 
• Lost wages for donor support 





• Effect on insurability 
• Effect on employment stability 
Direct Costs 
• Transportation to transplant center for testing, surgery, and follow-up care 
• Food, lodging, and incidentals for donor-related support 
• Dependent care 
• Uncovered medical expenses 
Below is the breakdown of each country’s incentive policy packages. 
1.4.2 Australia 
 
 Australia implemented its living organ donation program in 2013 in response to a 
decrease in donor numbers. Through the Australian Department of Human Services, the program 
provides financial support for post-surgery recovery leave. This program was then picked-up by 
the Australian Department of Health in 2015 and renamed The Supporting Leave for Living 
Organ Donors Program. The program provides: 
• Loss of Earnings — Compensation for living donor’s lost income for a full nine weeks 
post-op. The reimbursement is based on up to 342 hours of paid leave at the national 
minimum wage of $656.9 Australian dollars per week, or the donor’s current salary.30 
Funds are distributed through reimbursing the employer.  
• Travel and Child Care Expenses — The program reimburses out-of-pocket expenses 
associated with donation, including childcare and travel expenses.  
 
30 Australian Government Department of Health. “Supporting Living Organ Donors Program.” Australian 








Ireland’s Department of Health put into effect its Policy on the Reimbursement of 
Expenses of Living Kidney & Liver Donors in 2014. This policy states that all Irish donors are 
eligible for reimbursement of all costs associated with donating. These include: 
• Loss of Earnings — Incurred by an employed donor or a self-employed donor for up to 
twelve weeks pre/post-donation. 
• Travel Expenses — Donors are reimbursed for costs associated with travel and 
accommodation. 
• Child Care — Child care costs are also reimbursable.31 
This incentive policy is unique because it subsidizes international travel, enabling a donor that is 
outside of Ireland to travel to the country and donate an organ to an Irish national. The organ 
donor’s international travel costs and accommodation are reimbursed by HSE’s Living Donor 
Reimbursement Office in accordance with the Irish-donor laws. 
1.4.4 Israel 
 
Israel passed the Organ Transplantation Law in 2008 to increase the incidence of living 
donor transfers. It established a three-tier point based priority system. Individuals are given first-
tier priority to organs if they themselves are a living donor or they have a first-degree deceased 
donor relative. The second tier is for those that register themselves as a donor. The third-priority 
is designed to provide a clear incentive to patients who have first-degree family members that are 
registered as donors. This priority system provides a clear incentive based on both altruistic and 
 







self-interested motives. This tiered priority system is unique to Israel and is the first priority 
system to be put into effect globally. It was hoped that a flow on effect of this approach would 
help to lower the incidence of transplant tourism and organ trafficking. 
 Other features of the Israel organ donor law are less individually incentivized and more 
geared towards eliminating existing financial barriers and offering medical protection for the 
donor such as insurance. Key provisions of the Organ Transplant Law include: 
• Loss of Earnings — The cornerstone financial incentive is reimbursement for lost 
earnings. This funding is in place to offset the loss of income experienced by the donor 
related to preparing for and recovering from surgery. The government pays the donor for 
up to 40 days of medical unemployment benefit.  
• Travel Expenses— A refund is provided to the donor for travel expenses. This covers the 
donor’s travel expenses to and from the surgery center.   
• Recovery Leave — A financial incentive under this law is the provision of recovery 
leave. The government will pay for a seven-day stay in a hotel.  
• Behavioral Health — There is a refund for up to five psychological treatments 
undertaken up to 48 months after the organ donation.  
• Medical Insurance — The plan also offers private medical insurance for up to five years, 
the loss of work insurance for five years, and life insurance for up to five years.  
1.4.5 Saudi Arabia 
 
 Saudi Arabia passed a law in 2007 stating their reimbursement policy for living donors. 
This comprehensive program was passed to reduce the large number of Saudis participating in 
transplant tourism and to move the country toward greater self-sufficiency where human organs 





however about 600 Saudis still travel abroad to source their kidneys, mainly from Pakistan, 
Egypt, and India.32 The Saudi Arabia law provides the following incentives: 
• Loss of Income — Reimbursement for lost income. 
• Travel Expenses — Reimbursement of travel expenses associated with donation.  
• Life-Time Medical Care — Donors are provided with life-time medical care regulated at 
the national level.  
• Monetary Reward — Donors receive a one-time payment equivalent to about $13,300 
(US). 
• The King Abdul-Aziz Medal — Donors are awarded the King Abdul-Aziz Medal of the 
third degree. 
• Travel Discount — Donors are provided with a discount card giving them 50% off Saudi 
Arabian Airlines tickets for a lifetime.33  
The Ministry of Health and Saudi Center for Organ Transplantation are responsible for enforcing 
and administrating the policy. Because this policy offers a direct monetary reward for an organ 
donation, there are strict regulations in place to confirm the donor’s healthy physiological state 
and to ensure that they are making a free and independent choice.  
1.4.6 Singapore 
 
 The Singaporean government passed the Human Transplant Law (HOTA) in 1987 
outlawing organ trade and trafficking. It was amended in 2009 to include provisions intended to 
 
32 “Dilemma over Live-Donor Transplantation.” World Health Organization, World Health Organization, 4 Mar. 
2011, www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/1/07-020107/en/.  





encourage organ donation. Every Singaporean citizen that is not disabled, or has opted out of 
HOTA, falls under the purview of this law. Key provisions enacted under this legislation include: 
• Travel Expenses — All travel expenses associated with the donation process are 
reimbursed. 
• Loss of Earnings — Reimbursement costs associated with the surgery, including 
accommodation, domestic help or childcare, and loss of earnings so far as are reasonably 
or directly attributable to that person supplying any organ from his body. 
• Medical Insurance — Includes any short- or long-term medical care or insurance 
protection of that person who is or may reasonably be necessary as a consequence of his 
supplying any organ from his body.”34  
1.4.7 United Kingdom 
 
 The Human Tissue Act of 2004 regulates living organ donation across England, Northern 
Ireland, and Wales; (Scotland follows its own set of regulations regarding living tissue donations 
and removal). This act explicitly outlines that these reimbursements are not a reward for 
donation; paying the donor directly for donating an organ is illegal. Financial incentives in the 
act provide for the following: 
• Loss of Earnings — Reimbursement to the donor for loss of income for up to 12 weeks 
post-surgery. 
• Travel and Child Care Expenses — All costs associated with travel and childcare are 
reimbursable by The National Health Service. 
1.4.8 United States 
 
 





In September 2020, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) of the Health 
and Human Services Department released final rules removing financial disincentives to living 
organ donation. The rules amend the regulations implementing the National Organ Transplant 
Act of 1984 and expand the scope of reimbursable expenses incurred by living organ donors with 
the goal to reduce the number of individuals on the organ transplant waiting list by increasing the 
number of organs available for transplant. The criteria for reimbursement are based on the 
incomes of both the recipient and the donor. The revision allows for living organ donors to be 
reimbursed for: 
• Donor Evaluation — Expenses associated with donor suitability. 
• Loss of Earnings — Loss of wages are an appropriate reimbursable expense. 
• Medical Expenses — Hospitalization for the living donor’s surgical procedure and 
medical follow-up, clinic visits, or hospitalization within two calendar years following 
the surgical procedure. 
• Child Care and Elder Expenses — Reimbursable non-medical incidental expenditures. 
Having reviewed the incentive policies of Australia, Ireland, Israel, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States, I now frame an economic model of the 
market for kidneys.     
1.5 An Economic Model of the Market for Kidneys 
 
Incentives for organ donation fall under two categories: intrinsic and extrinsic. Altruistic 
donation is an intrinsic act, in the sense that the donation is made out of the goodness of the 
donor’s own heart. Governmental policies that encourage living organ donation provide extrinsic 
incentives. Rather than purchasing organs, extrinsic incentive policies reimburse donors for 





position. The financial barriers associated with the cost of donating are meant to be removed. It 
is predicted that rational, utility-maximizing individuals will respond positively to the 
reimbursement, leading to an increase in organ donations. 
Figure 1 illustrates this simple logic. The value of the extrinsic benefit (positive or 
negative) from organ donations is measured on the vertical axis, which we call the “price” and 
interpret as the price received by the donor. The quantity of organs supplied is represented on the 
horizontal axis. The supply of organs (S1 or S2) will include positive quantities of organ 
donations at negative prices if rational preferences defined over organ donation include altruism, 
as explained above (see 1.2.1). The demand for organs is represented in Figure 1 as perfectly 
inelastic for two reasons. First, the quantity of organs demanded may change very little with 
price due to few available substitutes for organs and an inconsequential income effect over the 
relevant (low) price range depicted in Figure 1. Perhaps more importantly, however, an increase 
in the price received by donors from a policy may have a very small effect on the price paid by 
recipients for that same organ. If the price paid by recipients does not change, then the perfectly 
inelastic demand curve simply represents the quantity demanded at the unchanged price paid by 
recipients.   
Assume the price received by organ recipients in the absence of any policy is P1. At this 
(negative) price, the quantity demanded exceeds the quantity supplied, and the market incurs a 
shortage of organs. A policy that reimburses donors for expenses incurred serves to increase the 
price from P1 to P2. It should be noted that a policy that completely reimburses donors will 
result in a price of zero (P2 is drawn slightly above zero only to distinguish the price line from 





The slope of supply curve is the focus of this empirical investigation. S2 reflects a very 
small increase in organ donations from a policy that increases the price received from P1 to P2.  
S1 models a more robust increase in organs in response to the policy. Whether the policy 
eliminates the shortage is a topic beyond the scope of this research. Certainly, if the supply curve 
is estimated to be something like S1 rather than S2 (with no impact on demand or the quantity 
demanded), then the shortage will decrease (the after-policy shortage is not illustrated in Figure 
1). It should be noted that it remains beyond the scope of the research to estimate the actual slope 
(or elasticity) of the supply curve because the treatment variables are not prices but 


















Chapter 2: Data 
 
2.1 Data on Organ Donations 
 
Table 1 summarizes the source of the organ donation data and provides a description of 
the government or organization (funded by the government) responsible for collecting the data. 
The HSE which collected the data for Ireland is the only organization that is not transplant/organ 
specific. HSE covers all health-related sectors for Ireland. All other organizations specialize in 
gathering organ donation data.  
Data are aggregated across each country (Australia, Ireland, Israel, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The data covers the period of 2004 to 
2019 for all countries excluding Singapore, which ranges from 2010 to 2019.  While data was 
available for all countries on organ donation numbers for 2020, certain control variables were not 
available. The COVID-19 pandemic may have impacted donation numbers in ways our control 





Figure 2. Organ Donations per Millionth across Years and Countries 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the quantity of organ donations over time in the sample of countries 
in this study. Israel and Saudi Arabia have the largest increase of organ donations over this time 
span. The United Kingdom and Ireland appear to have peaked in 2013 and 2017, respectively. 
Organ donations in the United States declined for many years before beginning to increase in 
2018—the year that their incentive policy went into effect.  
2.2 Treatment Variables 
 
 Table 3 summarizes the policy variables discussed in section 1.4. There are seven 
treatment variables, each corresponding to a policy variable. The first treatment variable is 
TravelExp. This is the treatment variable associated with donors being reimbursed for costs 
associated with travel expenses and accommodation. The reimbursement of travel expenses is 
the most abundant treatment variable, occurring 65.18% of the time in the sample. The second 





funding is in place to offset the loss of income experienced by the donor related to preparation 
for, and recovery from, the surgery. The government will pay the donor for lost income ranging 
from 40 days to 12 weeks depending on the country’s policy. The third variable is MedInsur 
which covers the policy whereby living organ donors are provided with medical care. This 
ranges from short- or long-term medical care, or insurance protection of that person. Depending 
on the country, the donor may even be entitled to a lifetime coverage plan that covers all medical 
expenses incurred by the donor. The fourth treatment variable, Incent1 bundles three policies 
unique to Saudi Arabia: donors are awarded the King Abdul-Aziz Medal of the third degree; they 
are provided with a lifetime discount of 50% off all Saudi Arabian Airlines tickets; and, they are 
given a one-time payment of $13,000 (US). These three variables are perfectly correlated in the 
sample, and so only one can be used in the analysis. The estimated coefficient on Incent1 
measures the effect of all three policies on living organ donation rates. The fifth treatment 
variable, Incent2, bundles policies unique to Israel to avoid perfect correlation. These policies are 
refunding the donor for up five post-operative psychological treatments (valid for 48 months 
after the operation); providing loss of work insurance for five years; and providing life insurance 
for up to five years. This treatment variable also includes Israel’s three-tier point based priority 
system (see 1.4.4). This is the least treatment variable which appears 10.71% of the time. The 
sixth variable is ChildCare, which refers to the reimbursement of childcare expenses. The 
seventh and final treatment variable we included was RecovLeave, which relates to the policy of 
offering donors a period for recovery ranging from a paid seven-day hotel stay to a longer period 
of paid leave. 
 These treatment variables are all dummy variables, also known as binary variables. They 





that policy is not in play. If a policy was put into effect mid-year, we would mark it as a “0” for 
that year and a “1” for the following year. The creation of these dummy or binary variables 
allows us to use these categorical variables in our regression analysis. 
2.3 Control Variables 
 
The data for the control variables was sourced from TheGlobalEconomy.com, a respected 
source specializing in providing data for researchers, businesses, and individuals with an interest 
in given economic indicators. The data are collected from multiple official sources including the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the World Economic 
Forum.35 A group of 13 indicators was selected as control variables for the panel data regression 
model that would best control for outside influences in the outcome. Table 2 lists and defines the 
control variables used in our model, including economic indicators, indicators representing 
technological advances, political corruption indicators, religion indicators, health related 
indicators, and inequality indicators.  
 Table 3 shows the summary statistics of these control variables. An important note is that 
these numbers are based on 112 observations. Looking at the GDP per capita in billions of US 
dollars, the minimum is 2.41 per capita in billions and the maximum is 4.37 per capita in 
billions. It is possible to observe from these values that the identified countries range widely with 
respect to their wealth. This is important for the analysis as it mirrors the world as a whole. 
Ireland has the maximum GDP per capita in the sample recorded in 2019 compared with Saudi 
Arabia in 2004 with the minimum. 
 





 Another key value to look at is the unemployment rate, a primary economic indicator of 
the overall health of an economy representing the share of the labor force that is without work 
but seeking employment. The highest unemployment rate recorded is 15.45% in Ireland from 
2012 which is significantly higher than any other unemployment rate for other countries and 
years. This disparity indicates Ireland is unable to generate enough employment for its citizens, 
that is, the people looking for work outnumber job availability. This value decreases significantly 
over the years and in 2019 is recorded to be 4.95% which is below the average of 6.23%. 
 The Rule of Law Index measures how much confidence agents have regarding citizens 
actually being willing to follow the law. Index calculation considers the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, law enforcement police, and the justice system, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. It ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, where 2.5 indicates that citizens have 
a high confidence in the laws being adhered to and followed. Saudi Arabia (2005) has the lowest 
rule of law index, -0.1. In subsequent years, Saudi Arabia’s rule of law index is significantly 
lower than other countries, which makes sense if one considers the high incidence of illegal 
transplant tourism.  
 We will also pay special attention to health spending: the current expenditures spent by 
countries on health per capita in current US dollars. The United States has the highest health 
spending, with $10,623.85 recorded in 2018 and 2019, in line with the fact that they are the 
largest economy, based on GDP. We only need compare the health spending in the United State 
with $400.88 spent by Saudi Arabia in 2004.  
The Gini coefficient is a method for controlling for inequality in a country that measures 
the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals deviates from a perfectly equal 





of 100 implies perfect inequality. Saudi Arabia and Singapore have the highest Gini coefficient, 
45.9, which is about 6 points above the mean, and 15 points greater than the minimum Gini 
recorded for Ireland. Of the seven countries, Saudi Arabia and Singapore have the highest 
inequality in terms of income distribution. Given that the Gini coefficient is missing for some 











 In Section 1.5, the theoretical effect that the price has on organ shortages is described as 
it relates to supply and demand. To demonstrate this relation in an analytical setting, the research 
objective is to explore the influence of different incentive policies on living kidney organ donor 
numbers, while controlling for certain population variables. To achieve the research objective, 
we run a fixed effects and random effects panel data linear regression model using time-series 
data to predict organ donor numbers from a combination of country wide control variables and 
incentive variables. This chapter details preliminary exploratory data analysis and the selection 
process. Following the presentation of the resulting models, interpretations and limitations of this 




All regression analyses were run in Stata 12.1 statistical software using data imported 
from a Microsoft Excel document with compiled data collected from sources listed previously. A 
linear regression test with panel data was conducted. This was achieved using a fixed effects 
estimator and a random effects estimator for each policy variable.36 
We next calculate the coefficient value to determine the size of the impact the variable 
has on donation numbers, while taking into account the t-value for fixed effects, the z-value for 
 
36 We tried to conduct a series of Hausman tests on each pair of fixed/random effects models to test which estimator 
was the best fit for the data. While the fixed effects model eliminates possible bias from ai, the random effects model 
is preferred, as it makes better use of the data by exploiting the variation between the seven countries. However, due 





random effects, and the p-value to see the significance of the variable in that model. We also 
looked at the overall, within, and between values of R2 to see how much variability the model 
accounts for or how well the model fits the data. 
3.2.1 Model 
 
 For our regression analysis this is our proposed model: 
𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + ∑𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑗 +  ∑𝜃𝑘𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝛼𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,7 𝑡 = 2004, 2005, … ,2019 𝑗 = 1,2, … ,7 𝑘 = 1,2, … ,13 
In this model 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑗 represents our treatment variables and 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑘 corresponds to our control 
variables. The “i” represents each of the seven countries (Australia, Israel, Ireland, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States), “t” is the year ranging from 2004 to 
2019, “j” is the seven treatment variables (TravelExp, LossofEarn, MedInsur, Incent1, Incent2, 
ChildCare, and RecovLeave), and “k” is the thirteen control variables (see Table 2).  
Our Y or dependent variable is “𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑡". This is the number of organ donations, orgDon, 
divided by the population to determine organ donations per capita. We then took the natural log 
of these new values to give us 𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑡. By taking the natural log of these new values, we ensure 
that the data is more normally distributed. This transformation of potentially curved data into a 
linear form allows us to run our linear regression tests.  
The model is then rounded out with two error terms comprised of the effects of 
unobserved variables, where “ai” are any of the unobserved factors (such as culture and health) 
that tend to stay constant over time (t) in a country, but vary across the different countries (i). 
These unobserved factors are different from the control variables; factors, such as culture, are 
very hard to quantify. Finally, "𝜇𝑖𝑡” are the unobservable factors that vary with time and country 





3.2.2 Fixed-Effects and Random Effects Estimators 
 
In fixed panel data the same individuals or in this case countries are observed over 
several points of time, i.e., years. Fixed effects estimator is used to eliminate ai in the model. 
When these factors are not eliminated, the model could contain biases as they could be correlated 
with organ donation and policies.  
Random effects allow for variation across countries and time to estimate the coefficients. 
Random effects will produce biased estimates if the unobserved variables that do not change 
over time (culture) are correlated with the policy variables.  
Both sets of results from each estimator are presented for comparison in Tables 5-12, but 
in the results section 3.3 we discuss only the fixed effects model. 
3.2.3 Regression Analysis 
 
Fourteen individual linear regression tests were conducted3738, one fixed effect and one 
random effect for each of the seven treatment variables. Policies were estimated separately to 
avoid possible collinearity caused by running all seven treatment variables together and to save 
on degrees of freedom in the relatively small sample. Table 13 shows the correlation coefficients 
between the policies. LossofEarn has a strong positive correlation (correlation coefficient above 
0.5) with TravelExp, MedInsur, and ChildCare. TravelExp also has a strong positive correlation 
with MedInsur and ChildCare. Incent2 shows a strong correlation with MedInsur and 
 
37 We initially conducted a fixed effects regression test with all seven treatment variables included. This test resulted 
in LossofEarn, RecovLeave, and Incent1 all being significant. However, the standard error for these terms was 
extremely large, 218.98, 259.92, and 331.85 respectively. Additionally, Incent2 was omitted. This model only 
described 4.98% of the variability. Based on all these factors, the individual tests are better suited to investigate 
organ donations per capita.  
38 We also ran the model with a comprehensive “policy” binary variable (1= if any of the 7 policies is enacted, 0 = 





RecovLeave. The collinearity between treatment variables justifies estimating models separately 
with single policy variables. 
Each test included39 all the control variables listed previously, the one policy variable that 
was focused on, and three interactive terms. Across all tests we interreacted the same three 
control variables with the treatment variable in question: gini, namely the Gini coefficient, 
measures the distribution of income in a country and signifying the inequality present in a given 
country “i”; beds is the number of hospital beds per 1,000 people; unemp is the unemployment 
rate or number of jobless people actively seeking jobs. These interactive terms provide insight 
into the relation between the two variables and measure how the effect of policy can vary across 
the interactive term. By adding interactive terms, we can interpret the policies impact on organ 
donations with specific control variables. For example, comparing a country with the minimum 
recorded Gini coefficient versus a country with the maximum recorded Gini value allows us to 
see the effect a policy has on donation rates when focusing on inequality. 
Each estimated coefficient is tested with the following hypothesis: 
𝐻0: 𝐵𝑗 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1,2. . ,7 
𝐻𝑎: 𝐵𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1,2, … ,7 
We are also testing which control variables are significant to our model with the following 
hypothesis: 
𝐻0: 𝜃𝑘 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 = 1,2. . ,13 
𝐻𝑎: 𝜃𝑘 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 = 1,2, … ,13 
 
39 We reran the models and included a linear time trend variable, year. We hoped this time trend would help control 
for unobserved characteristics that affect living donations over time (medical tech advances perhaps). However, we 








 Below, we summarize the results from just the fixed effects estimator model. See Tables 
5 through 12 to see results from both random and fixed effects linear regression tests. We also 
include only the control variables, treatment variables, and interactive terms that are significant 
at the 10% level (where zero is out of the confidence interval with 90% confidence). We note, 
political systems vary widely across nations making out-of-sample forecasting possible but not 
inherent to the model. We also note that these results are based off of 112 observations.  
3.3.1 Travel Expenses 
 
Table 5 provides the regression results for the TravelExp variable. In both fixed effects 
(fe) and random effects (re) this policy variable is significant. TravelExp is significant at the 99% 
level as the P-value is 0.001, therefore rejecting the null hypothesis. Other significant variables 
are giniTravel, bedTravel, beds, juds (percent of population practicing Judaism), chris (percent of 
Christians in a population) (all at the 99% level). Unemp and freedom are significant at the 95% 
level and internUser is significant at the 90% level. 
The fixed effects model for this policy is: 
𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑡̂ =  −16.78 + 4.183𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 − 0.068𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 − 0.4208𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙
+ 0.0458𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 + 0.0063𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 + 0.0122𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 − 0.2391𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠
− 0.306𝑗𝑢𝑑 + 0.225𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑠 
It has an overall R2 value of 0.0652 meaning it explains 6.52% of the variability of the per 
capita organ donations. While this is quite the low, the R2 within each country, “i”, is 0.8795, 





The estimated coefficient with coefficients on the interacted variables allows us to 
conclude—for a country with a mean Gini coefficient and mean number of hospital beds per 
thousand—that organ donations increase by 7.95%40 when travel expenses are reimbursed. The 
coefficient on TravelExp carries the greatest value compared with giniTravel and bedsTravel as 
it is a significantly larger number. Looking at the interactive term bedsTravel, the more hospital 
beds for 1,000 people in a country, the ability to have travel costs reimbursed has a negative 
correlation with the number of organ donations. A possible explanation is that in countries with 
more hospital beds, citizens do not have to travel as far to see doctors and have the organ 
transplant surgery.  
As the Gini value of a country increases, the slope of the supply graph moving out, 
resulting in the organ shortage continuing. When interpreting the giniTravel term in context, it 
also has a negative effect on the number of organ donations, while this interactive term is not as 
large as when TravelExp is interacted with beds, it is still significant. The greater the inequality 
(gini) in a country, the ability to have travel costs reimbursed has a negative effect on the number 
of organ donations. One hypothesis is that this relationship occurs because countries with high 
inequality do not have as good travel provisions (i.e., public transport), which prevents donors 
from traveling and incurring related costs. 
     The control variables are also important to examine when considering why the number 
of organ donations rise and fall. Unemp, internUsers, freedom, and chris all have a positive 
effect on organ donations. The percentage of Christians in a country has the largest positive 
coefficient value associated with it, 0.225. Holding all other variables constant, on average, 
organ donations increase by 22.5% with each percent increase of Christians in a population. 
 





Perhaps organ donation is strongly encouraged in the Christian religion as an act of generosity 
and love. Pope John Paul II stated that, “The Catholic Church would promote the fact that there 
is a need for organ donors and that Christians should accept this as a ‘challenge to their 
generosity and fraternal love’ so long as ethical principles are followed.”41 Beds and jud have a 
negative relation with the number of organ donations. Unlike in Christianity, Judaism does not 
encourage living organ donations as the body should be intact for burial. In Jewish law, no organ 
may be removed from a donor until after that donor’s death. Because Judaism insists that honor 
and respect are due to the dead,42 an increase of one percentage point in the Jewish fraction of 
the population decreases organ donations by 30.6%. 
3.3.2 Loss of Earnings  
 
Table 6 is our regression results for our LossofEarn variable. This variable is only 
significant in the fixed effects (fe) tests. LossofEarn is significant at the 99% level as the P-value 
is 0.001. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis. Other variables that are significant at the 99% 
level are the two interactive terms giniEarn and bedEarn, as well as lifeExp, beds, jud, and chris. 
Unemp and freedom are significant at the 95% level and interUser is significant at the 90% level. 
Our fixed effects model for this policy is: 
𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑡̂ =  −22.77 + 4.02𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 − 0.064𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 − 0.474𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛 + 0.0409𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝
+ 0.0057𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 + 0.0121𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 + 0.2057𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝 − .246𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠
− 0.312𝑗𝑢𝑑 + 0.254𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑠 
 
41 Theological Perspective on Organ and Tissue Donation. 7 Aug. 2019, unos.org/transplant/facts/theological-
perspective-on-organ-and-tissue-donation/.  






It has an overall R2 value of 0.0657 meaning it explains 6.57% of the variability of the 
data. While this is quite the low, the R2 within each country n is 0.8821. Within each country, 
this model explains 88.21% of the changes to organ donation over time.  
The estimated coefficient with coefficients on the interacted variables allows us to 
conclude that, for a country with a mean Gini coefficient and mean number of hospital beds per 
thousand, organ donations increase by 7.37%43 when loss of income is reimbursed. Looking at 
the interactive term bedsEarn, the more hospital beds for 1,000 people in a country, the ability to 
have loss of income reimbursed has a negative effect on the number of organ donations. 
Additionally, as the Gini value of a country increases, the slope of the supply graph moving out, 
resulting in the organ shortage continuing 
When interpreting the giniEarnl term in context, it also has a negative effect on the 
number of organ donations, while this interactive term is not as large as when LossodEarn is 
interacted with beds, it is still significant. The greater the inequality (gini) in a country, the 
smaller the effect of income reimbursement on the number of organ donations. One hypothesis is 
that this relationship occurs because in countries experiencing greater inequality citizens are not 
making significant enough income to be worried about reimbursement. However, it is also true 
that we would expect the opposite relationship: the lower a person’s income, the more important 
money is for that person. The expectation is that a person with a low income will care more 
about income reimbursement. Our results did not indicate that this is the case. Based on the trend 
witnessed in this study, it is not safe to assume that people on a lower income will be motivated 
by income reimbursement. 
 





     The control variables are also important to examine when considering why organ 
donations rise and fall. Unemp, internUsers, freedom, lifeExp and chris all have a positive effect 
on organ donations. The percentage of Christians in a country and expected life expectancy have 
the largest positive coefficient value associated with them, 0.254 and 0.2057, respectively. 
Holding all other variables constant, on average organ donations increase by 25.4% with each 
percentage increase of Christians in a population. This finding is unsurprising if one considers 
that organ donation is encouraged in the Christian religion, or at least not prohibited (see above). 
Life expectancy also has a significant effect on organ donor numbers in the context of this 
model. As life expectancy increases, the percent of organ donations also increases by 20.57%. 
Perhaps this is because the ability to get a kidney transplant and not die from kidney failure 
would increase life expectancy of the person and the country overall. 
 Similar to the TravelExp model, Beds and jud have a negative relation with the number 
of organ donations. However, in relation to reimbursement of loss income they have greater 
impact on organ donations than in the previous model. Unlike in Christianity, Judaism does not 
encourage living organ donations (see discussion above). Thus, the percentage of people 
practicing Judaism in a population decreases organ donations by 31.2%. On average, organ 
donation rates decrease by 24.6% when the number of hospital beds per thousand increase. If the 
number of hospital beds correlates with the quality of the healthcare system in a country, then the 
greater the number of hospital beds, the better the healthcare system, and less need for organs 
(given not as much kidney failure).  
3.3.3 Recovery Leave   
 
Table 7 provides regression results for the RecovLeave variable. This variable is only 





is 0.000. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. Other variables that are significant at the 99% 
level are the interactive terms bedsLeave, unemp, internUsers, and beds. Freedom is also 
significant at the 90% level.  
Our fixed effects model for this policy is: 
𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑡̂ =  −5.05 + 5.4227𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 − 0.9546𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 + 0.011𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠
− 0.241𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠 +  0.0089𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 
It has an overall R2 value of 0.0606 meaning it explains 6.06% of the variability of the 
data. While this is quite the low, the R2 within each country n is 0.8923, meaning within each 
country this model explains 89.23% of the change of organ donation over time. 
The estimated coefficient with coefficients on the interacted variables allows us to say, 
for a country with the mean number of hospital beds per thousand, organ donations increase by 
26.24%44 when a period of paid recovery is offered post-surgery. Looking at the interactive term 
bedsLeave, the more hospital beds for 1,000 people in a country, the ability to have a period off 
work to recover has a negative effect on the number of organ donations. It is possible to 
hypothesize that maybe places with more hospital beds have better surgeons and therefore do not 
need as much time off to recover from surgery. 
The control variables internUsers and freedom have a positive relationship with organ 
donation rates. On average, as the percent of the population that uses the internet increases, organ 
donations increase by 1.1%. We hypothesis this positive relationship is because people who use 
the internet have ready access to information and could be more aware of the implementation of 
policies and more up to date on the possibility of living donation. Additionally, holding other 
variables constant, as the percentage of people who perceived noncorrupting increased, organ 
 





donation rates increase by 0.89%, on average. We can hypothesize that this positive relationship 
is because that in countries that are freer from corruption there may be more confidence that the 
donation will be as the donor directs compared with corrupt countries where organ bazars and 
transplant tourism take place.  
Beds is the only control variable that has a negative impact on organ donations in this 
model looking at the effects of a period of recovery being offered post-op. This consistent 
negative relationship between beds and organ donation rates can be hypothesized that if the 
number of hospital beds reflects the health system of the country, then the greater the number of 
beds the better the system and less need for organs because there is not as much kidney failure. 
3.3.4 Medical Insurance 
 
Table 8 provides regression results for the MedInsur variable. This variable is not 
significant in either the fixed effect estimator or the random effects with a p-value of 0.968 and 
0.011, respectively. Therefore, we fail to reject our null hypothesis in both instances. Offering 
medical insurance does not have significant effect on the percent of organ donations.  
In the fixed effects estimator model the interactive term unempMed is significant at the 
99% level as well as freedom, lifeExp, and beds. InterUser and chris are significant at the 95% 
level. 
The fixed effects model for this policy is: 
𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑡 =  −15.75 − 0.1458𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝑒𝑑 + 0.0082𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 + 0.014𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚
+ 0.19𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝 − 0.4024𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠 +  0.1296𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑠 
It has an overall R2 value of 0.0666 meaning it explains 6.66% of the variability of the 





The estimated coefficient with coefficients on the interacted variable unempMed indicates 
that for a country with the mean unemployment rate of 6.23%, organ donations increase by 
4.65%45 when medical insurance is offered for a period ranging from five years to a lifetime after 
donation. This positive relationship is what we would expect from an incentive being offered. 
The greater the unemployment rate in a country, the smaller the effect of medical coverage on 
the number of kidney donations. It is possible to hypothesize this relationship exists because of 
our small sample of countries. Only three of our countries (Singapore, Israel, and Saudi Arabia) 
offer the medical insurance policy in a given year and none of these countries has a very high 
unemployment rate. The slope of the supply line becomes steeper and more inelastic the more 
unemployed people there are in a country. 
The control variables internUsers, freedom, lifeExp, and chris have a positive 
relationship with organ donation rates. On average, as the percent of the population that uses the 
internet increases, organ donations increase by 0.82%. We hypothesis this positive relationship is 
because people who use the internet have ready access to information and could be more aware 
of the implementation of policies and more up to date on the possibility of living donation. 
Additionally, holding other variables constant, as the percentage of people who perceived 
noncorrupting increased, organ donation rates increase by 1.4%, on average. We can hypothesize 
that this positive relationship is because that in countries that are freer from corruption there may 
be more confidence that the donation will be as the donor directs compared with corrupt 
countries where organ bazars and transplant tourism take place. The percent of Christians in a 
country and expected life expectancy have the largest positive coefficient value associated with 
them, 0.129 and 0.19, respectively. Holding all other variables constant, on average, organ 
 





donations increase by 12.9% with each percent increase of Christians in a population. This is to 
be expected as organ donation is strongly encouraged in the Christian religion as it is seen as an 
act of donation and love.46 Life expectancy also has a significant effect on organ donor numbers 
in this model. As life expectancy increases, the percent of organ donations increases by 19%. 
This is because the ability to get a kidney transplant and not die from kidney failure would 
increase life expectancy of the person and the country overall. 
In this model beds is the only control variable that has a negative impact on organ 
donations when looking at the effects of a period of recovery being offered post-op. Holding all 
other variables constant, on average, organ donations decrease by 40.24% with an increase in the 
number of hospital beds.  This consistent negative relationship between beds and organ donation 
rates can be hypothesized that if the number of hospital beds reflects the health system of the 
country, then the greater the number of beds the better the system and less need for organs 
because there is not as much kidney failure. 
3.3.5 Incentive Bundle 2 
 
Table 9 shows the regression results for the Incent2 variable. This variable is only 
significant in the fixed effects (fe) tests. Incent2 is significant at the 90% level with a t-value of 
1.68. Therefore, we reject our null hypothesis. The two interactive terms bedCent2 and 
unempCent2 are significant at the 95% level. Other significant variables are interUser and beds 
at the 99% level and freedom, lifeExp, and jud at the 90% significance level.  
The fixed effects model for this policy is: 
 






𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑡̂ =  −11.748 + 7.41166𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡2 − 3.0104𝑏𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡2 − 0.1542𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡2
+ 0.0085𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 + 0.0099𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 + 0.1277𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝 − 0.406𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠
+  0.2681𝑗𝑢𝑑 
It has an overall R2 value of 0.0011 meaning it explains 0.11% of the variability of the 
data. This is our lowest R2 value recorded. 
The estimated coefficient with coefficients on the interacted variable allows us to say that 
for a country with the mean number of beds per thousand (3.03) and the mean unemployment 
rate (6.23%), organ donations increase by 86.94%47 when the policies included in this treatment 
variable are offered. Looking at the interactive term bedsCent2, the more hospital beds for 1,000 
people in a country, the policies unique to Israel (pay for up to five psychological treatments 
undertaken up to 48 months after the donation; provide loss of work insurance for five years; 
provide life insurance for up to five years. Also have a three-tier point based priority system (see 
1.4.4)) have a negative effect on the number of organ donations. When interpreting the 
unempCent2 term in context, it also has a negative effect on the number of organ donations. 
While this interactive term is not as large as when Incent2 is interacted with beds, it is still 
significant. The greater the unemployment rate in a country, the ability to have the policies 
bundled into this treatment variable has a smaller effect on the number of organ donations. 
     The control variables are also important when considering why organ donations rise 
and fall. InternUsers, freedom, lifeExp and jud all have a positive effect on organ donations. On 
average, as the percent of the population that uses the internet increases, organ donations 
increase by 0.85%. We hypothesis this positive relationship because people who use the internet 
are going to be more aware of the implantation of policies and more up to date on the possibility 
 





of living donation as they have more information available to them at their fingertips. 
Additionally, holding other variables constant, as a person perceived freedom from corruption 
increased, organ donation rates increase by 0.99%, on average. We can hypothesis that this 
positive relationship because it is likely more legal organ donations take place in countries that 
are freer from corruption compared with corrupt countries where organ bazars and transplant 
tourism would take place. Life expectancy also has a significant effect on organ donor numbers 
in this model. As life expectancy increases, the percent of organ donations increases by 19%. 
This is because the ability to get a kidney transplant and not die from kidney failure would 
increase life expectancy of the person and the country overall.  
It is unusual that the percent of the population practicing Judaism has a positive effect on 
the number of organ donations because living donation is not encouraged in this religion. This 
abnormality could be because Israel was the only country looked at in this model and the 
population of Jewish people could have just coincidently happened to increase as organ 
donations increased. 
Beds is the only control variable that has a negative impact on organ donations in this 
model looking at the effects of a period of recovery being offered post-op. Holding all other 
variables constant, on average, organ donations decrease by 40.6% with an increase in the 
number of hospital beds.  This consistent negative relationship between beds and organ donation 
rates can be hypothesized that if the number of hospital beds reflects the health system of the 
country, then the greater the number of beds the better the system and less need for organs 
because there is not as much kidney failure. 






Tables 10 and 11 summarize the regression results for the Incent1 variable. When 
running a regression test on this variable as was done for all the others, the variable was omitted 
due to collinearity. Therefore, it was not included in the results (see Table 10). However, as this 
is the main variable of interest, the test was retained removing all other variables to see which 
was causing the error and discovered it was the interaction between the terms gini and incent1. 
This variable was removed from the regression and is discussed below. 
This variable is not significant in neither fixed effect estimator nor random effects with a 
p-value of 0.167 and 0.635, respectively. Therefore, we fail to reject our null hypothesis in both 
instances. Offering travel discounts, a medal of honor, and a direct monetary reward does not 
have a significant effect on the percent of organ donations. Additionally, the remaining two 
interactive terms have no significant effect on living organ donations rates.  
3.3.7 Childcare   
 
Table 12 provides the regression results for the ChildCare treatment variable. This policy 
variable is not significant in either fixed effects estimator or random effects with a p-value of 
0.559 and 0.005, respectively. Therefore, we fail to reject our null hypothesis in both instances. 
Offering reimbursement of child care costs does not have significant effect on the percent of 
organ donations. The interactive term unempChild is significant at the 99% level as well as the 
control variables freedom, lifeExp, and beds. Mus is significant at the 95% level and chris is 
significant at the 90% level.  
The fixed effects model for this policy is: 
𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑡̂ =  −25.00 + 0.0098𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 + 0.016𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 +  0.343𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑝 − 0.409𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑠





It has an overall R2 value of 0.0696 meaning it explains 6.96% of the variability of the 
data.  
The estimated coefficient with coefficients on the interacted variables allows us to say, 
for a country with a mean unemployment rate of 6.23%, organ donations increase by 61.24%48 
when childcare expenses are reimbursed. The interactive term unempChild is the only interactive 
term in any of our seven models that has a positive relationship with organ donations. The 
greater the unemployment rate in a country, the offer to reimburse childcare expenses has a more 
positive effect on the number of organ donations. This suggests that countries with high 
unemployment numbers are influenced by the financial costs of childcare coverage. It is possible 
to hypothesize this relationship exists because a country with a high unemployment values the 
ability to place children in organizational care, thus allowing job seekers to seek work 
undistracted. Therefore, the slope of the supply line becomes more horizontal and elastic the 
more unemployed people there are in a country. 
The control variables freedom, lifeExp, and chris have a positive relationship with organ 
donation rates. Holding other variables constant, as a person perceived freedom from corruption 
increased, organ donation rates increase by 1.6%, on average. We can hypothesis that this 
positive relationship because it is likely more legal organ donations take place in countries that 
are freer from corruption compared with corrupt countries where organ bazars and transplant 
tourism would take place. The percent of Christians in a country and expected life expectancy 
have the largest positive coefficient value associated with them, 0.144 and 0.343, respectively. 
Holding all other variables constant, on average organ donations increase by 14.4% with each 
percent increase of Christians in a population. This is to be expected as organ donation is 
 





strongly encouraged in the Christian religion as it is seen as an act of donation and love.49 Life 
expectancy also has a significant effect on organ donor numbers in this model. As life 
expectancy increase, the percent of organ donations increase by 34.3%. This is because the 
ability to get a kidney transplant and not die from kidney failure would increase life expectancy 
of the person and the country overall. 
Beds and mus have a negative impact on organ donations in this model looking at the 
effects of childcare reimbursement. Holding all other variables constant, on average organ 
donations decrease by 40.24% with an increase in the number of hospital beds.  This consistent 
negative relationship between beds and organ donation rates can be hypothesized that the 
number of hospital beds reflects the health system of the country, the greater the beds the better 
the system and the less of a need for organs because there isn’t as much kidney failure.  
Muslims believe that God greatly rewards those who save others from death, so we 
would not expect the percent of the population practicing Islam to have a negative relationship 
with organ donation rates. Violating the human body, whether living or dead, is normally 
forbidden in Islam. The Shariah, however, waives this prohibition in a number of instances: 
firstly, in cases of necessity; and secondly in saving another person’s life.50 However, in this 
model an increase of one percentage point in the Muslin fraction of the population decreases 
organ donations by 17.21%. It is possible to hypothesis that this anomaly occurred because 
Muslims, just like Jews, are picky about burial rites and it’s just not a tradition to donate organs. 
It doesn’t occur to them.  
  
 
49 Theological Perspective on Organ and Tissue Donation. 7 Aug. 2019, unos.org/transplant/facts/theological-
perspective-on-organ-and-tissue-donation/.  






Chapter 4:  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
4.1 Review of Objectives and Results 
 
This study sought to investigate the effects of government incentive policies on the 
number of living kidney donors, then specifically evaluate the significance of different policies. 
The importance of living organ donations and addressing the current shortages globally was 
outlined. We discussed the unethical practices that these shortages are causing, thus prompting 
the creation of the Declaration of Istanbul and international standards for organ donation 
guidelines and ethics. The research goal was to test whether the reimbursement packages offered 
in Australia, Ireland, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
would increase living kidney organ donations. After selecting the seven countries because of 
their comprehensive incentive policies, organ donor data was collected from many sources and 
compiled it into one data set which was used as the basis for the research. A number of control 
variables were selected from TheGlobalEconomy.com for inclusion in our model. This allowed 
us to directly control for outside factors that could be correlated with policy implementation, 
current events that happened in various years, and organ donor numbers. After reading numerous 
other studies on this topic, we theorized that as price increased the supply of organ donors would 
increase, thus reducing the organ shortage.  
4.2 Discussion 
 
 Regression analysis indicates treatment variables TravelExp, LossofEarn, RecovLeave 
and Incent2 are all significant in the fixed effects model.  In context, this means that 





of recovery, and the policies unique to Israel increases living kidney organ donations by 7.95%, 
7.37%, 26.24%, and 89.94% respectively, when interpreted with the mean Gini coefficient, 
number of hospital beds per thousand, and unemployment rate. The remaining three treatment 
variables, MedInsur, Incent1, and ChildCare did not significantly affect the number of organ 
donations (without the interactive term).  
Based on Apte’s study (see section 1.3.2) we hypothesized that a country like the United 
States—where there is great economic disparity—would see a dramatic increase in living organ 
donors if a generous reimbursement package were offered. If, like Saudi Arabia and Israel, the 
United States considered offering long-term health insurance, then our projection is that the 
number of living organ donors would rise as the pursuit of healthcare would motivate donors 
who do not have adequate health care. This was the case in our analysis, while it was not 
significant, it increased organ donations by 4.64% in the countries that implanted this policy 
(Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Israel). 
Bedcent2 and unempCent2 were significant and when interpreted with the mean number 
of hospital beds per thousand and unemployment rate organ donations decrease by 267.05%. 
This treatment variable associated with policies implanted by only Israel has the largest effect on 
donation rates in our regression tests. This is not in line with Apte’s research where she found 
that Israel donor numbers doubled while their incentive package was in effect.  
Incent1 had no significant effect on organ donation rates. This was the package unique to 
Saudi Arabia and had the lowest occurrence rate in the data. The final treatment variable 
ChildCare was also found to be insignificant when not interacted with anything. UnempChild 





organ donation numbers. When interpreted with the mean unemployment rate it increased living 
kidney donations by 6.11%.  
Based on these results the implementation of three out of the seven treatment variables 
would positively increase living kidney donations. 
4.2.1 Limitations 
 
 The regression analysis presented some limitations that we need to acknowledge, 
including missing data, omitted variables, small number of countries(n) used, and data “darning”. 
Here, we discuss the challenges that these issues presented and how they may have adversely 
affected our results. Considering study limitations naturally lends itself to contemplation of 
future research directions, which we elaborate on in the next section.  
 Certain data for the control variables were not available for every year and country in our 
data. This weakens the statistical power of the analysis as that whole year is then not included in 
the regression. Thus, for our control variables that aren’t recorded every year, we made the 
assumption that the change between a year would be marginal and therefore could be recoded as 
the previous year’s value. Specifically, the Gini coefficient is not collected and recoded each 
year, so we let the few years it was recoded in each country account for all years we needed 
(2004 to 2019).  However, these are still missing data points and not a completely accurate 
representation of the country/year in question. 
 Additionally, while the fixed effects model does eliminate the bias caused by ai there 
could be other omitted variables that we did not control for in our model. 
 Since the data used in this study is only from seven countries it is not necessarily 
representative of the world as a whole. The world has countries that vary greatly in terms of their 





account when looking at incentive polices and organ donation numbers. If the necessary data 
could be collected and obtained for living donations from all countries, it would form a more 
accurate representation of the effects of reimbursement packages as well as the current state of 
organ donations. Further, as this study was only conducted with data from a 16-year period, the 
findings may not be directly representative of the effects of the policies. The incentive policies in 
The United States had been in effect for only one year when our data was collected. This isn’t a 
very significant amount of time to judge the effectiveness of a policy. On the flip side of that the 
United Kingdom’s data doesn’t date past before the policies were put into effect. Thus, we can’t 
see the change over time in donation rates from the incentive policy.   
 Finally, the data on living kidney donations was collected from seven different sources 
(one for each country) and combined into the one data set we used. While we tried to be as 
consistent as possible to ensure that all data being reported was in fact from a) living donors and 
b) donors donating kidneys, there is going to be discrepancies between the different 
organizations data reporting. For example, one country might consider the end of the year 
December 1st and report their findings for that year ending then, whereas another country might 
wait till January 1st of the following year to stop counting donations from that previous year.  
4.3 Future Research  
 
Both the challenges and successes of this study suggest many directions for future 
research. These include repeating the analysis with a larger sample size; repeating it with 
individual level data looking at variables such as income, race, and gender of the donor; and also 
looking at how these policies have affected transplant tourism. The few discussed here represent 





By including all countries where living organ donor data is represented, we would have a 
more accurate representation of how these policies affect donor numbers. It would paint a larger 
picture of the world’s population’s relationship with incentives when it comes to organ donation. 
It would also give us control countries to look at when analyzing our results. We believe this 
type of study is a few years off as the seriousness of living organ donation is just starting to be 
acknowledged and therefore data is limited. The United States is considered the world’s leading 
economic superpower, that being said they only recently (2019) implemented any type of policy 
to break down the financial barriers in place preventing organ donation.  
We believe it would also be interesting to gain individual level data on organ donors as 
well as non organ donors and see how demographic variables effect donor numbers. We could 
answer questions like, how does income affect a person’s likelihood to be a living organ donor. It 
would also lead to an interesting comparison of race, gender, or age with and organ donation. 
Kidney disease disproportionately affects minorities and low-income patients in America. 
Compared to whites, African Americans are three and a half times more likely to have kidney 
failure, Native Americans are one and half times more likely to have kidney failure, and 
Hispanics are one and half times more likely to have kidney failure.51 Would this same disparity 
between people suffering from kidney failure be seen in people willing to donate?  
This same idea could also be put into a survey and asked globally and looked at from a 
more behavioral economic view point. For example, randomly selected individuals would be 
asked how likely they were to donate a kidney today. Another group of people would be told 
various statistics surrounding organ donation like the one above about minorities being affected 
and asked how likely they would be to become a living donor. We could then analyze if 
 






minorities, when told that they were the ones most commonly being affected by kidney failure, 
would be more willing to donate.   
Another area for future research is looking at organ harvesting and illegal organ trading. 
Our motivation for looking at living organ donation was sparked by reading Bloody Harvest: 
Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China (2009), by David Matas and David 
Kilgour, an ethnographic study of the Falun Gong, an ascetic religious group. In 1999, the 
Chinese government outlawed the Falun Gong, leading to their arrest, torture, kidnapping, and 
imprisonment. In Bloody Harvest, the authors establish that the Chinese government was 
harvesting organs from these prisoners resulting in their eventual death. This book was eye- 
opening for me and lead me to want to explore the topic further. Internationally, China appears to 
have one of the shortest organ waitlists. However, based on my reading of Bloody Harvest, I now 
know that some Chinese citizens do not donate organs willingly and neither does the Chinese 
government put in place maximizing incentive policies.  
While the lack of data is what lead us to investigate the incentive policies rather than 
looking at the welfare of countries and how this affected illegal organ trafficking, we still believe 
this would lead to an interesting study. We could also use what we now know about the role of 
incentive policies in the organ shortage problem and make suggestions regarding policies that 
countries grappled with unethical organ trading posts could implement. 
Another interesting sub-topic of the organ shortage discussion is Iran. Iran is the only 
country where selling one’s organ is legal. The study of this country and how this policy has 
affected its waitlist times and number of people dying from kidney failure each year could be a 







 This thesis examined seven countries (Australia, Ireland, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
the United Kingdom, and the United Sates) over the past 16 years (2004-2019) to evaluate the 
effect of incentive polices on living kidney donation rates. As the focus of this study is the 
impact of policy on donation numbers, the primary variables of interest were those that indicated 
living kidney donation numbers and other binary variables that represented the policies in effect. 
We also controlled for other factors that could have an impact on donation rates such as wealth 
indicators, the quality of the health care system, and demographic factors.  
 We then looked at other studies that have been conducted on this topic that found 
incentive policies to have an effect on organ donations. These studies also discussed the ethical 
implications of implementing these polices such as financially taking advantage of the poor.  
 To test the significance of these treatment variables (the policies) we conducted 14 
individual fixed effects and random effects regression tests. These were able to tell us that 
reimbursement of travel expenses, income, childcare, and providing a period of paid recovery all 
significantly increase donation rates. Offering medical insurance and the polices included in 
incent1 (unique to Saudi Arabia) relates to decreases in the number of organ donations.  
 The organ shortage that we as country are facing is growing. By implementing polices we 
hope as a nation to shrink this shortage and save the lives of thousands of people who die each 
year from kidney failure. Additionally, by increasing the availability of kidneys for transplant 
Medicare and health insurance companies will save the billions of dollars spent annually on 
dialysis. Not only is kidney transplantation the preferred way to treat kidney failure for patients, 
it also makes the most financial sense. This paper has shown that governments can help 





costs associated with donations, reimburse individuals for income lost while undergoing and 
recovering from surgery, offer a period of paid recovery, and offer incentive unique to Israel 
(including their priority system, life insurance, loss of work insurance, and psychological 
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Table 1. Data Sources and Descriptions 
Countries Data Collected 
By: 
Description of Organization Data 
Australia ANZDATA An organization funded by the 
Australian and New Zealand 
governments and Kidney 
Health Australia to gather data 
on living kidney donors and 
their perspectives. It provides 
information on the long-term 
health of living kidney donors 
in Australia and New Zealand 
The number of living 
kidney donations per year, 
going back to 2004 
Israel ADI - National 
Transplant 
Center. 
This is a branch of the 
Ministry of Health that is 
charge of handling organ 
donations and transplants. 
They are responsible for 
everything from collecting 
organs and registering the 
patients to reimbursing donors 
and advocating for the vital 
importance of organ donation. 
The number of living 
kidney donations per year, 
going back to 2004 
Ireland HSE An organization funded by the 
government and overseen by 
the Minister of Health. The 
HSE provides all of Ireland's 
public health services in 
hospitals and communities 
across the country. 
The number of living 
kidney donations per year, 
going back to 2004 
Saudi Arabia Saudi Center 
for Organ 
Transplantation 
The Saudi Center’s mission is 
to alleviate suffering through 
organ transplants. 
The number of living 
kidney donations per year, 
going back to 2004 
Singapore Live On An organization run out of 
Singapore National Organ 
Transplant Unit and the 
Ministry of Health. Live On 
supports organ donations and 
spreads awareness of the 
incredible effects of donating 
an organ 
The number of living 
kidney donations per year, 










This group is a part of the 
NHS. Along with collecting 
data, this collaborative body is 
responsible for managing the 
donation, storage, and 
transplantation of blood, 
organs, tissues, bone marrow, 
and stem cells, and researching 
new treatments and processes. 
The number of living 
kidney donations per year, 
going back to 2004 





The SRTR is managed by the 
Division of Transplantation 
and the United States 
Department of Health and 
Human Services. This 
database has information about 
every transplant and organ 
donation from October 1987 
until today in the United 
States. 
Individual Level: 
citizenship, age, education 
level, ethnicity, gender, 
geographic location by 
state, race, insurance, and 
income level (10,000 units) 
Panel Data: The number of 
kidney donations by living 




Table 2. Description of Control Variable 
Name Control Variable Definition as defined by 
TheGlobalEconomy.com 
gdp GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product, in 
billions per capita 
unemp Unemployment Rate The share of the labor force that 
is without work but seeking 
employment. 
lawInd Rule of Law Index Captures the perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society; likelihood of 
crime and violence. Ranges 
from -2.5 to 2.5, where the 
higher the value, the more 
confidence agents have in 
society. 
interUser Internet users Individuals who have used the 
internet in the last 3 months, as 





freedom Freedom from corruption index Derived from Transparency 
International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index. 
healthSpend Health spending per capita Current expenditures on health 
per capita in current US dollars. 
lifeExp Life expectancy The number of years a newborn 
infant would live if prevailing 
patterns of mortality at the time 
of its birth were to stay the 
same throughout its life. 
beds Hospital beds Per 1,000 residents 
gini Gini income inequality index Measures the extent to which 
the distribution of income 
among individuals deviates 
from a perfectly equal 
distribution. 
jud People practicing Judaism Percent of Population 
mus Muslims Percent of Population 
chris Christians Percent of Population 
 
Table 3. Description of Treatment Variable and Occurrence Rate in Data 
Name Policy Variable Occurrence 
TravelExp Donors are reimbursed costs associated with 
travel expenses and accommodation 
73 (65.18%) 
LossofEarn Compensation for living donors' lost income 
for varying weeks post-op (country 
dependent) 
66 (58.93%) 
MedInsur Donors are provided with medical care 
regulated at a national level. Coverage 
varying from 5 years up to a lifetime. 
36 (32.14%) 
Incent1 Unique to Saudi Arabia: Donors are awarded 
the King Abdul-Aziz Medal of the third 
degree and provided with a discount card 
giving the donor 50% off all Saudi Arabian 
Airlines tickets for a lifetime. Also given a 
one-time payment of $13,000 
13 (11.61%) 
Incent2 Unique to Israel: Refund up to 5 
psychological treatments undertaken up to 48 
months after the donation; provide loss of 
work insurance for 5 years; provide life 
insurance for up to 5 years. Also have a 
three-tier point based priority system (see 
1.4.4). 





ChildCare Reimbursement of childcare expenses. 39 (34.82%) 
RecovLeave A period for recovery ranging from a paid 7-
day vacation to a period of paid-time off. 
25 (22.32%) 
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics of Control Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
GDP (PerGDP) 3.71 0.41 2.41 4.37 
Unemployment Rate 
(unemp) 
6.23 2.55 3.68 15.45 
Rule of Law 
(lawInd) 
1.36 0.58 -0.01 1.92 
Internet Users 
(interUser) 
70.89 18.29 10.23   95.72 
Freedom from 
corruption (freedom) 
73.03 15.75   33 95 
Population Size 
(pop) 
63.47 103.79 4.07 328.24 
Health Spending 
(healthSpen) 
3,910.92 2,461.36 400.88 10,623.85 
Life Expectancy 
(lifeExp) 
79.82 2.73 73.16 83.15 
Hospital Beds (beds) 3.03 0.72 2.41 5.64 
Gini coefficient 
(gini) 
39.22 5.29 30.9 45.9 
People practicing 
Judaism (jud) 
11.38 26.97 0 79.10 
Muslims (mus) 19.63 32.15 0 97 









Table 5. Regression Results for TravelExp Variable  
 Random-Effects Fixed-Effects 
Variables Coef z-value P Coef t-value P 
Treatment Variables 
TravelExp 2.6493* 1.95 0.051 4.1834*** 3.57 0.001 
giniTravel -.0646*** -2.73 0.006 -.0683*** -3.52 0.001 
bedTravel .15859 1.11 0.266 -.4208*** -3.01 0.003 
unempTravel -.0521 -1.48 0.140 -.0241 -1.15 0.254 
Control Variables 
unemp -.0442 -1.99 0.046 .0458** 2.62 0.011 
lawInd .9798** 2.48 0.013 -.1191 -0.45 0.655 
interUser .0226*** 5.92 0.000 .0063* 1.90 0.062 
freedom .0152** 2.17 0.030 .0122** 2.37 0.020 
healthSpend .0001** 2.32 0.021 5.35e-06 0.11 0.913 
lifeExp -.0992 -2.18 0.030 .1749 2.36 0.021 
beds -.4017*** -3.78 0.000 -.2391*** -3.23 0.002 
gini .0754*** 2.76 0.006 .0202 0.62 0.537 
jud .0256*** 4.46 0.000 -.3062*** -3.44 0.001 
mus .0192** 2.35 0.019 -.1314 -1.70 0.093 
chris .01629*** 3.26 0.001 .2254*** 3.42 0.001 
perGDP -1.568*** -5.56 0.000 -.1441 -0.60 0.547 





R2 O=0.8253 W=0.6412 B=0.9847 O=0.0652 W=0.8795 B=0.1122 
 
Table 6. Regression Results for LossofEarn Variable  
 Random-Effects Fixed-Effects 
Variables Coef z-value P Coef t-value P 
Treatment Variables 
lossOfEarn -.1334 -0.10 0.923 4.01986*** 3.50 0.001 
giniEarn -.02145 -0.88 0.378 -.0645*** -3.39 0.001 
bedEarn .2275 1.44 0.149 -.4739*** -3.57 0.001 
unempEarn .0291 0.79 0.427 -.0104 -0.51 0.609 
Control Variables 
unemp -.0911*** -4.17 0.000 .0409** 2.39 0.019 
lawInd .5409 1.21 0.226 -.2213 -0.86 0.393 
interUser .0223*** 5.19 0.000 .0057* 1.71 0.091 
freedom .0233*** 3.01 0.003 .0121** 2.38 0.020 
healthSpend .0001*** 2.99 0.003 .00001 0.29 0.773 
lifeExp -.0277 -0.58 0.562 .2057*** 2.64 0.010 
beds -.4874*** -4.21 0.000 -.2463*** - 3.41 0.001 
gini .01230 0.45 0.650 .0254 0.80 0.424 
jud .02061*** 3.09 0.002 -.3122*** -3.59 0.001 
mus .0201** 2.09 0.037 -.1243 -1.62 0.109 





perGDP -1.5852*** -4.95 0.000 -.0939 -0.41 0.682 
_cons 6.4967* 1.80 0.072 -20.772*** -2.62 0.010 
R2 O= 0.7838 W= 0.5877 B= 0.9676 O= 0.0657 W=0.8812 B= 0.1109 
 
Table 7. Regression Results for RecovLeave Variable  
 Random-Effects Fixed-Effects 
Variables Coef z-value P Coef t-value P 
Treatment Variables 
RecovLeave 3.6212** 2.26 0.024 5.4227*** 4.85 0.000 
giniLeave -.0369 -1.19 0.233 -.0434 -1.86 0.067 
bedLeave -.3499 -1.03 0.303 -.9546*** -3.39 0.001 
unempLeave -.1104 -2.30 0.022 -.0908 -2.39 0.019 
Control Variables 
unemp -.0473 -1.84 0.066 .0452*** 2.89 0.005 
lawInd .6862 1.64 0.101 .0489 0.19 0.849 
interUser .0221*** 5.95 0.000 .0110*** 3.52 0.001 
freedom .0258*** 3.52 0.000 .0089* 1.84 0.069 
healthSpend .0002*** 4.59 0.000 -.0001 -2.01 0.048 
lifeExp -.0688 -1.22 0.223 .1026 1.22 0.228 
beds -.3053 -2.35 0.019 -.2611*** -4.04 0.000 
gini .0059 0.34 0.730 .0228 0.82 0.417 





mus .0135* 1.62 0.106 -.1011 -1.39 0.168 
chris .0032 0.58 0.561 .0387 0.63 0.532 
perGDP -2.1253*** -6.98 0.000 -.0814 -0.40 0.693 
_cons 10.8958*** 2.71 0.007 -5.0492 -0.60 0.548 
R2 O=0.7932 W= 0.6209 B= 0.9582 O= 0.0606 W=0.8923 B= 0.1417 
 
Table 8. Regression Results for MedIns Variable  
 Random-Effects Fixed-Effects 
Variables Coef z-value P Coef t-value P 
Treatment Variables 
medInsur 11.0548** 2.53 0.011 -.1026 -0.04 0.968 
giniMed -.2067 -2.54 0.011 .0032 0.07 0.948 
bedMed -.9966 -1.95 0.051 .3087 1.07 0.286 
unempMed .0595 0.75 0.452 -.1458*** -2.87 0.005 
Control Variables 
unemp -.0618*** -2.66 0.008 .0145 1.05 0.297 
lawInd .1434 0.32 0.749 -.1303 -0.50 0.621 
interUser .0240*** 5.67 0.000 .0082** 2.50 0.015 
freedom .0223*** 3.05 0.002 .0140*** 2.71 0.008 
healthSpend .0001** 2.33 0.020 -.0001 -2.01 0.047 
lifeExp .0072 0.15 0.880 .1900*** 2.65 0.010 





gini .0359 1.48 0.138 -.0222 -0.77 0.444 
jud .0123* 1.62 0.105 -.04203 -0.37 0.713 
mus .0104 1.13 0.259 -.0822 -1.04 0.300 
chris .0078 1.57 0.116 .1296** 2.18 0.032 
perGDP -1.6866*** -5.05 0.000 .0224 0.09 0.926 
_cons 3.5223 1.06 0.287 -15.7515 -2.19 0.032 
R2 O=0.7883 W= 0.6047 B= 0.9643 O= 0.0666 W=0.8760 B= 0.1251 
 
Table 9. Regression Results for Incent2 Variable  
 Random-Effects Fixed-Effects 
Variables Coef z-value P Coef t-value P 
Treatment Variables 
incent2 2.2041 0.31 0.756 7.4166* 1.68 0.097 
giniCent2 .0459 0.38 0.704 .0901 1.31 0.193 
bedCent2 -.9298 -0.46 0.647 -3.0104** -2.19 0.031 
unempCent2 -.1549 -1.17 0.241 -.1542** -2.20 0.030 
Control Variables 
unemp -.0564** -2.36 0.018 .01903 1.41 0.162 
lawInd -.1183 -0.26 0.793 -.0789 -0.31 0.754 
interUser .0218*** 5.84 0.000 .0085*** 3.00 0.004 
freedom .0248*** 3.37 0.001 .0099* 1.95 0.055 





lifeExp .0183 0.39 0.693 .1277* 1.79 0.078 
beds -.3372*** -3.36 0.001 -.4064*** -6.94 0.000 
gini .0044 0.26 0.795 -.0280 -0.98 0.328 
jud .0096 1.21 0.227 .2681* 1.62 0.109 
mus .0072 0.78 0.438 -.1203 -1.55 0.126 
chris .0063 1.23 0.218 .0938 1.59 0.115 
perGDP -2.0118*** -7.41 0.000 -.0126 -0.06 0.953 
_cons 5.0541 1.57 0.115 -11.7482 -1.67 0.099 
R2 O=0.7840 W= 0.6151 B= 0.9539 O= 0.0011 W=0.8850 B= 0.0021 
 
Table 10. Regression Results for Incent1 Variable  
 Random-Effects Fixed-Effects 
Variables Coef z-value P Coef t-value P 
Treatment Variables 
Incent1 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
giniCent1 .0361 0.48 0.635 -.0595 -1.39 0.167 
bedCent1 -.0413 -0.05 0.957 .5457 1.29 0.199 
unempCent1 -.2035 -0.40 0.686 .2707 0.98 0.328 
Control Variables 
unemp -.0887*** -4.15 0.000 .0045 0.30 0.763 
lawInd .3039 0.74 0.458 .0297 0.11 0.915 





freedom .0261*** 3.47 0.001 .0131** 2.36 0.021 
healthSpend .0002*** 5.27 0.000 -.0001 -1.48 0.142 
lifeExp .0276 0.55 0.581 .2471*** 3.35 0.001 
beds -.4526*** -4.30 0.000 -.4432*** -6.22 0.000 
gini -.0104 -0.61 0.543 -.0497 -1.88 0.064 
jud .0182*** 3.05 0.002 -.1435 -1.62 0.109 
mus .0137 1.56 0.118 -.1301 -1.60 0.113 
chris .0084* 1.71 0.088 .1428** 2.33 0.022 
perGDP -1.9865*** -7.18 0.000 .1109 0.44 0.663 
_cons 4.5268 1.36 0.174 -17.5870 -2.33 0.022 
R2 O=0.7748 W= 0.5710 B= 0.9691 O= 0.0705 W=0.8614 B= 0.1286 
 
Table 11. Regression Results for Incent1 Variable (excluding Gini interactive term) 
 Random-Effects Fixed-Effects 
Variables Coef z-value P Coef t-value P 
Treatment Variables 
Incent1 1.6562 0.48 0.635 -2.7295 -1.39 0.167 
bedCent1 -.0413 -0.05 0.957 .5457 1.29 0.199 
unempCent1 -.2035 -0.40 0.686 .2707 0.98 0.328 
Control Variables 
unemp -.0887*** -4.15 0.000 .0045 0.30 0.763 





interUser .0179*** 3.29 0.001 .0019 0.53 0.598 
freedom .0261*** 3.47 0.001 .0131** 2.36 0.021 
healthSpend .0002*** 5.27 0.000 -.0001 -1.48 0.142 
lifeExp .0276 0.55 0.581 .2472*** 3.35 0.001 
beds -.4526*** -4.30 0.000 -.4432*** -6.22 0.000 
gini -.0104 -0.61 0.543 -.0497 -1.88 0.064 
jud .0182*** 3.05 0.002 -.1435 -1.62 0.109 
mus .0137 1.56 0.118 -.1301 -1.60 0.113 
chris .0084* 1.71 0.088 .1428** 2.33 0.022 
perGDP -1.9865*** -7.18 0.000 .1109 0.44 0.663 
_cons 4.5268 1.36 0.174 -17.587** -2.33 0.022 
R2 O=0.7748 W= 0.5710 B= 0.9691 O= 0.0705 W=0.8614 B= 0.1286 
 
Table 12. Regression Results for ChildCare Variable  
 Random-Effects Fixed-Effects 
Variable Coef z-value P Coef t-value P 
Treatment Variables 
ChildCare 3.9230*** 2.83 0.005 -1.3440 -0.59 0.559 
giniChild -.2284*** -6.60 0.000 .0150 0.22 0.825 
bedChild .8197*** 6.87 0.000 .0249 0.10 0.920 






unemp -.0714*** -4.85 0.000 -.0108 -0.53 0.599 
lawInd .2295 0.68 0.497 -.2386 -0.86 0.393 
interUser .0120*** 4.52 0.000 .0015 0.54 0.588 
freedom .0155*** 2.99 0.003 .0162*** 3.24 0.002 
healthSpend -.0001 -1.75 0.080 -.0001 -1.19 0.239 
lifeExp .1178*** 3.37 0.001 .3430*** 4.18 0.000 
beds -.6226*** -8.18 0.000 -.4092*** -5.19 0.000 
gini .1310*** 5.56 0.000 -.0136 -0.45 0.652 
jud -.0183*** -2.93 0.003 -.1528 -1.58 0.118 
mus -.0206*** -2.57 0.010 -.1721** -2.31 0.024 
chris -.0149*** -3.24 0.001 .1440* 1.88 0.064 
perGDP -.5134** -2.23 0.026 -.0328 -0.15 0.880 
_cons -7.9610*** -2.56 0.010 -24.99*** -2.95 0.004 
R2 O=0.8983 W= 0.7630 B= 0.9987 O= 0.0696 W=0.8818 B= 0.1280 
 
Table 13: Correlation Coefficients Between Treatment Variables 
 
 LossofEarn TravelExp RecovLeave MedInsur Incent1 Incent2 ChildCare 
LossofEarn 1       
TravelExp 0.8755 1      
RecovLeave 0.4475 -0.3918 1     
MedInsur 0.5746 0.5031 -0.1820 1    
Incent1 0.2892 0.2532 0.6462 0.5033 1   
Incent2 0.3025 0.2649 -0.1943 0.5265 -0.1255 1  
ChildCare 0.6102 0.5342 0.1483 -0.0616 -0.2532 -0.2649 1 
Laverty-Smith 
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